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Troy Colling and Warren Christensen† 
There is growing community acceptance of regulatory compliance activities that address the 
misuse and poor management of our natural resources.  However, in some areas and industries, 
there is still a significant degree of resistance to these programs. 
Utilising Queensland’s vegetation management processes as a case study, this paper explores a 
range of criminogenic factors, such as Rational Choice/Routine Activities Theory and 
Control/Social Bond Theory, that may promote regulatory non-compliance by landholders and 
the ongoing rejection of regulatory requirements as being excessively restrictive and intrusive.  It 
is argued that this ongoing rejection of regulatory requirements provides evidence of an 
entrenched view in some areas, that the ‘penalties do not fit the crime’. The paper will also 
consider how, as part of a balanced approached to compliance, strategies that promote ‘trust’ 
between regulators and the regulated may ultimately assist in altering these attitudes and 
improve levels of voluntary regulatory compliance. 
Introduction 
The ongoing debate into the effects of climate change is generating growing 
community concern that the continued misuse of our natural resources will have 
significant negative impact on our economy and quality of life.  There is a growing 
awareness that land clearing and the use of precious fresh water reserves must be 
effectively managed for our and future generations. 
The recently released Stern Review (2006) found that ‘the scientific evidence is 
now overwhelming: climate change is a serious global threat’ (Stern 2006, p.1).  It 
was argued that climate change will affect the basic elements of life for people 
around the world and that if we do not act, the overall costs and risks will be 
equivalent to losing at least 5 per cent of global GDP each year.  In a worst case type 
scenario, the review found that ‘if wider risks and impacts are taken into account, 
costs in global GDP could be as high as 20%’ (Stern 2006, p.1).  Therefore, it was 
argued that, in relation to addressing the effects of climate change, ‘the benefits of 
strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of doing nothing’ (Stern 
2006, p.1).  Stern (2006, p.4) recommended that curbing deforestation is a highly cost-
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effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and that urgent action needs to 
be taken in order to manage and preserve remaining areas of forest.   
As regulators, society looks to government agencies such as the Queensland 
Department of Natural Resources and Water (DNR&W) to ensure that their 
compliance strategies will protect the environment now and into the future.  
Agencies such as DNR&W need to be able to demonstrate that they can effectively 
assist government to develop legislation, policies and regulatory strategies that 
encourage and, if necessary, enforce the use of natural resources in a manner that 
maintains a balance between society’s current demands and the needs of future 
generations.  However, in doing this, agencies must also ensure that they do not 
deny individuals their right to aspire to wealth and to derive that wealth from the 
lawful, responsible and sustainable use of our natural resources.  In short, they must 
ensure that they are ‘getting the balance right’. 
To ensure that agencies tasked with managing our natural resources are 
meeting their regulatory obligations and maintaining public confidence in their 
activities, they need to regularly ‘take stock’ of how effectively they are ‘doing 
business’ with those landholders, key industries and other stakeholders who are 
being regulated.  To maintain regulatory effectiveness, there are two fundamental 
questions that regulatory agencies need to ask.  The first is ‘Are our agency’s rules 
being obeyed’?  The second is ‘If not, why not’? 
Within the scope of these two ‘simple’ questions, we can engage in a wide 
range of criminological, legal, administrative, social and economic research and 
debate.  However, the fact still remains that any measure of agency effectiveness 
must be couched in terms that reflect the level of compliance with the agency’s rules. 
Given the need for all natural resource regulatory agencies regularly to 
question the effectiveness of their compliance strategies, this paper will explore a 
range of issues that may impact on how compliance strategies and their associated 
penalties are accepted or seen to ‘fit the crime’ by those being regulated.  
In doing so, this paper will canvas criminological theory exploring factors that 
may contribute to landholders’ rejecting regulatory programs as ‘not fitting the 
crime’, through being excessively restrictive and intrusive.  The paper will also 
discuss how these factors may erode the value of coercive regulatory strategies, 
creating a culture of resistance by landholders against the normative values 
underpinning those strategies.  This will be followed by a discussion of the use of 
trust as a regulatory strategy.  While the issue of trust will be a difficult one for those 
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being regulated to accept, it is perhaps even more so for those doing the regulating.  
However, it will be argued that the adoption of strategies that improve trust between 
regulators and stakeholders in tandem with compliance strategies that incorporate a 
continuum of compliance actions, can lead to an increased acceptance of compliance 
regulation. 
The paper concludes with a number of research options that could be 
undertaken to better ensure that our penalties are fitting the crime, by asking the 
offenders themselves. 
Why offend: A theoretical overview? 
There are many criminological theories about why individuals commit deviant acts 
(i.e. offend).  Three of these, Rational Choice, Routine Activities and Control/Social 
Bond Theory are briefly examined to provide a potential theoretical base for 
explaining, managing and assisting in the prevention of environmental/natural 
resource offences.   
Rational Choice & Routine Activities Theory   
It is argued that ‘the essence of rational choice perspective is that the individual will 
take advantage of an offending opportunity if the expected benefits exceed expected 
costs’.  These benefits can be ‘tangible gains such as money or avoided 
inconvenience’ or they can be ‘psychic benefits associated with the act’.  The possible 
costs ‘are determined by the likelihood and severity of externally imposed formal 
and informal sanctions and the strength of moral regret’ (Nagin and Paternoster 
1994, p. 582). 
Put simply, the argument is this:  a person who commits an offence has 
rationally weighed up the risks and benefits of the situation and has made a rational 
choice to commit that offence. 
The routine activity theory of crime, which is closely associated with rational 
choice theory, directs its attention, not at the ‘characteristics of offenders’, but ‘upon 
the circumstances in which they carry out predatory criminal acts’ (Cohen and 
Felson 1979, p. 588). 
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The theory posits that ‘most criminal acts require convergence in space and 
time of likely offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians against 
crime’ (Cohen and Felson, 1979, p. 588).  These three factors have become known as 
the crime triangle (see Figure 1) (Clarke and Eck 2003). 
Figure 1 Crime Triangle.  
Crime Triangle 
Suitable Target Motivated Offender 
Crime 
Capable Guardian 
 
This convergence in space and time is facilitated by the legitimate ‘routine activities’ 
of our daily lives that serve to bring us into contact with, or mask the activities of, 
motivated offenders, in effect allowing illegal activities to feed upon the legal 
activities of everyday life. 
In summary, Routine Activities Theory explains how legitimate patterns of 
work and recreation can result in increased opportunities for illegal activities, while 
Rational Choice Theory identifies the factors that ‘encourage’ offenders to take 
advantage of those opportunities (Clarke 1999). 
Control & Social Bond Theory 
Control Theory is a theory of conformity which asks why people do not offend as 
opposed to why do they offend (Hirschi 1969).  The answer is ‘Social Bonding’. Put 
simply, Control Theory maintains that it is the strength of a person’s social bond to 
conventional society that determines the likelihood of their conforming to societal 
norms or acting in a deviant manner.  A strong bond to conventional society results 
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in greater conformity while a weak bond to conventional society results in a greater 
tendency to commit deviant acts (Hirschi 1969). 
There are four core elements to Social Bond Theory: 
• Attachment.  People who develop strong attachments to significant others 
(i.e. parents, peers) are less likely to deviate from accepted community 
norms for fear of earning the disapproval of those significant others. 
• Commitment.  This refers to the personal investment people make in areas 
such as their education, businesses and careers.  The greater the investment 
in time and effort in these areas, the greater the reluctance to place this effort 
at risk by engaging in behaviour deemed to be deviant. 
• Involvement. This again involves the time and effort individuals place in 
accepted conventional activities.  Put simply, the more time and effort an 
individual places into conventional activities the less time they have to 
commit deviant acts.  
• Belief. In effect, this implies that there must be a belief on the individual’s 
part in the commonly held community norms prohibiting deviant activities. 
(Hirschi 1969) 
Theory and ‘real world’ compliance ‘offending’ 
How can these theories be used to explain ‘real world’ breaches of environmental 
law? 
Rational Choice Theory maintains that: 
• A person who commits an offence has rationally weighed up the risks and 
benefits of the situation and has made a rational choice to commit that 
offence; and 
• Benefits can be defined as ‘tangible gains such as money or avoided 
inconvenience’. 
It can be argued that some landholders, particularly those producing high value 
products (i.e. beef cattle and irrigated food/fodder crops) or those struggling for 
financial survival may be tempted to breach vegetation and water compliance 
regulations for financial gain.  This may include, for example: 
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• The illegal clearing of vegetation for fodder purposes, particularly in areas 
significantly affected by drought, to maximise the number of head that can be 
run; 
• The illegal clearing of vegetation for the establishment of improved pasture to 
increase the head of cattle able to run on a property; 
• The illegal taking of water for stock watering purposes; and 
• The illegal taking of water by irrigators (i.e. illegal pumps, allocation overuse 
or other breach of permit) in order to produce high value food or fodder 
crops. 
Indeed, it has been argued by a number of stakeholder groups that vegetation 
management legislation has cost agricultural industries many millions of dollars in 
forgone economic development.  This view has been supported by farmer surveys 
conducted by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(ABARE) as part of their report, Native Vegetation Public Conservation on Private Land: 
cost of forgone development in southern and western Queensland (2006).  This report 
argued that the cost of forgone development in the area covered by the study was in 
the order of $520 million. 
Landholders may also be tempted to breach compliance regulations in order to 
avoid inconvenience.  Stakeholder groups have argued that vegetation management 
legislation has subjected landholders to complicated approval processes and 
difficult-to-understand permit systems and has also placed unfair restrictions on 
property management activities such as: 
• Thinning of regrowth; 
• Control of weed growth/spread; 
• Establishment of farm infrastructure; 
• Maintenance of farm roads and boundary fences; and 
• The clearing of vegetation for fodder in drought conditions. 
As stated above, Routine Activities Theory explains how legitimate patterns of work 
and recreation can result in increased opportunities for illegal activities.  In this case, 
it would be a landholder who: 
• while engaged in the legitimate ‘day to day’ property management 
operations (i.e. permitted take of water or vegetation clearing) 
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• is motivated to breach a ‘natural resource compliance regulation’ (i.e. 
illegal take of water or vegetation clearing for profit or to avoid 
inconvenience) 
• in the absence of anyone who is likely to challenge the activity. 
It can be argued that many potential breaches of compliance regulations investigated 
by regulatory agencies stem from activities that either were or are currently 
permitted as part of ‘day to day’ property management operations.  These can 
include the establishment and operation of infrastructure for the taking of water or 
the clearing of vegetation for fodder and other ongoing purposes.  Many of these 
potential breaches are likely to occur on properties in remote locations, far from the 
direct view of casual observers or regulatory agencies. Furthermore, even if they 
were casually observed, it would be difficult to tell (without further investigation) if 
the irrigation or clearing operations were being conducted unlawfully. 
Therefore, it could be argued that it would be easy for a motivated offender to 
be presented with a likely target in the perceived absence of a capable guardian. 
As a result of these observations, this paper would argue that Routine Activities 
Theory can be used to explain how legitimate patterns of work on many properties 
can result in increased opportunities for illegal activities, while Rational Choice 
Theory can be used to identify the factors that ‘encourage’ some landholders to take 
advantage of those opportunities. 
We now turn to Control/Social Bond Theory which, as stated above, is a theory 
of conformity in which people develop self-control and conform to community 
norms (laws) if they are effectively bonded to the community.  One of the four core 
elements of Social Bond Theory, belief, states that there must be a belief on the 
individual’s part in the commonly held community norms prohibiting deviant 
activities. 
In this case, for landholders to voluntarily conform to natural resource 
compliance regulations they would need to accept or be ‘bonded’ to broad 
community norms that vegetation and water resources need to be protected for the 
benefit of the whole community.  If landholders do not share these norms and are not 
‘bonded’ to broader community views, then there is a high probability they will 
reject laws based on those norms.  Indeed, it can be argued that in attempting to 
enforce laws/regulations based on those rejected norms, landholders may develop a 
culture of resistance to perceived ‘unjust’ regulations forced on them by others who 
benefit at their expense. 
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Unfortunately, a quick scan of rural media articles and letters to the editor will 
quickly reveal, to even the most casual reader, the deep feelings of rejection and 
distrust of city ‘attitudes’ and rules that exist in some communities.  In some areas, 
there is a fundamental rejection particularly in relation to vegetation management 
regulations of: 
• The science underpinning the need for such regulations; 
• The adoption of the precautionary principle in relation to resource 
management; 
• The perceived benefits, both locally and for the wider community and; 
• The compensation offered to those affected by natural resource management 
legislation. 
Therefore, according to Control/Social Bond Theory, it should come as no surprise 
that landholders who do not trust or believe in (i.e. are not ‘bonded’ to) the 
regulations being imposed upon them will: 
• View associated legislation with utmost suspicion – i.e. as a land grab, 
denial of rights etc; 
• Not trust the regulatory agency;  and 
• View the agency’s officers with suspicion and hostility (i.e. as tree police, 
bullies, act like Nazis etc). 
Can a coercive ‘deterrence’ strategy be used to advance compliance 
activities? 
It can be argued that the adoption of a deterrence strategy, utilising highly punitive 
coercive measures in combination with significantly elevated levels of observation 
and investigation, should be successful in reducing breaches of compliance.   
In terms of Rational Choice Theory, a punitive deterrence strategy should be 
able to reduce illegal activity through: 
• Increasing levels of investigation and observation; and 
• Imposing severe punishments on those who breach compliance regulations.      
Put simply, increasing the chances of being ‘caught in the act’ through increased 
observation; in combination with a highly punitive compliance regime, should make 
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potential offenders ‘rationally’ reconsider their actions, as the costs of committing the 
offence may now outweigh the gains.  
In terms of Routine Activities Theory, the increased levels of observation and 
investigation, in combination with a punitive compliance regime, should serve to 
reduce breaches of compliance by: 
• Disrupting the convergence in space and time of likely offenders and 
suitable targets (landholders are being watched) and;  
• Enhancing the power of the capable guardians (punitive deterrence 
punishments). 
However, as the above discussion on Control /Social Bond Theory demonstrated, 
this may not be the case. It was argued that, if landholders do not believe in (i.e. are 
not ‘bonded’ to) the norms on which compliance regulations are based, there is a 
high probability that they will reject those regulations.  Furthermore, attempts to 
enforce regulations that are based on rejected norms may result in landholders 
developing a culture of resistance to the ‘unjust’ regulations being forced on them. 
Therefore, while compliance strategies based on punitive measures may be 
successful in reducing breaches in compliance, they may be counter productive in the 
long term, creating entrenched resistance that significantly reduces the voluntary 
uptake of compliance activity. 
This view is supported by a growing body of criminological research, which 
argues that regulatory agencies that significantly rely on coercive regulatory 
strategies to regulate ‘industry’, place themselves at risk of inadvertently 
encouraging a culture of resistance within that industry (see Cherney 1997).  When 
this occurs, those within the industry may embark upon a deliberate process of legal 
resistance, counterattack and political/public action to undermine the regulatory 
tools, actions and credibility of the regulatory agency.  Therefore, it could be argued 
that a deterrence only approach may be a very high risk approach to compliance 
enforcement. 
Can ‘trust’ be used as a mechanism to advance compliance activities? 
There are a number of criminological studies which argue that trust can play a vital 
role in ensuring compliance in a range of regulatory environments (see Cherney 
1997).  These studies have demonstrated that: 
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• Regulatory agencies can improve levels of compliance by building ‘trust’ 
relationships (Braithwaite and Makkai 1994); 
• Corporations will respond positively, in terms of compliance, to regulatory 
strategies that are based on the assumption that the corporation wants to 
‘do the right thing’ (Fisse and Braithwaite 1993); 
• Regulatory agencies need to gain the trust of those being regulated in 
order to promote voluntary compliance (Pettit 1996); and 
• Trust can form the basis of an effective regulatory strategy (Ayers and 
Braithwaite 1992).  
Put simply, it is argued that in order for a regulatory agency to use trust as a 
mechanism to improve compliance, activities that promote trust and build trust-
based relationships with stakeholders must be the primary focus of that agency.  As 
stated by Professor Arie Freiberg (2000): 
 ‘The gap between regulatory theory and practice can be narrowed if extensive 
consultation between all the parties involved in the regulatory exercise is 
undertaken’ (2000, p. 7). 
Activities that focus on distrust should be kept in the background.  It should be noted 
that while a trust-based compliance strategy attempts to improve compliance uptake 
by initially trusting stakeholders, it can shift to a ‘hard headed’ punitive response 
when trust fails (Braithwaite 1996). 
As stated by Cherney: 
 ‘Rather than constraining the regulatory game, as is the habit of coercive 
strategies, a trust based strategy enables regulatory models to be designed 
around more dynamic and innovative frameworks.  It can shift between praise 
and punishment, regulation and self-regulation, citizenship and self interest. It 
can hold out the possibility of nurturing virtue and it can respond aggressively 
when this fails’. (1997, p. 80) 
Compliance Enforcement: A measured response. 
It is this trust-based approach to regulatory compliance that has given rise to the 
development of the ‘regulatory pyramid’.  The ‘regulatory pyramid’ provides a range 
of compliance responses that can be escalated depending on the actions of those 
being regulated (Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 1993, 1996).  The aim of 
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this pyramid is to provide a measured response to compliance activity that helps 
maintain a balance between the trust and punitive elements of regulatory 
enforcement strategies. 
At the base of the pyramid are activities that seek to promote compliance 
through dialogue, mutual goal setting, education and self regulation.  If these mutual 
trust-based efforts fail, compliance responses can be escalated up the pyramid.  
Regulations can be enforced through a scale of harsher penalties, ranging from 
warnings and civil/criminal sanctions through to license suspension or revocation 
(Cherney 1997; Ayers and Braithwaite 1992). 
However, it should be acknowledged that communication with 
landholders/stakeholders by compliance agencies to build trust-based relationships 
can be problematic.  As suggested by Pannell et al. (2006) traditional methods of 
communicating with farmers (i.e. through the provision of agronomic extension 
services), unless carefully crafted, may not reach their target audience with the 
desired message: 
 ‘Even with the most expert and persuasive extension, landholders are not 
likely to change their management unless they can be convinced that the 
proposed changes are consistent with their goals’ (Pannell et al. 2006). 
DNR&W compliance strategy: A balanced approach 
The Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Water, like many other 
regulatory agencies, has developed a compliance strategy based on the escalations of 
the regulatory pyramid. 
DNR&W’s compliance strategy recognises that compliance enforcement must 
encompass a range of activities, both proactive and reactive (see Figure 2).  Hence, 
DNR&W has adopted a multidisciplinary approach that reflects the principles of the 
regulatory pyramid, incorporating three broad functions: namely,  
• A proactive capability; 
• A reactive capability; and 
• A strategic capability. 
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Figure 2   Compliance Spectrum. 
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Proactive 
DNR&W attempts to engage stakeholders to build understanding and trust through 
the adoption of education and awareness strategies, as well as a mix of incentives, 
licensing and auditing programs to promote regulatory compliance in the 
community. Such activities may be focused on specific groups or on the community 
as a whole.  Proactive activities are designed to encourage voluntary compliance, 
thereby lowering the level of non-compliance with natural resource laws. 
Reactive 
If these consultative trust-based approaches are not successful and DNR&W becomes 
aware of allegations of non-compliance, it will investigate and assess the 
circumstances surrounding the incident of non-compliance. The guiding principle in 
every case is that of proportionality; that is, the enforcement option chosen should 
reflect the seriousness of the offence. In some circumstances, as per the regulatory 
pyramid, lower level responses such as warnings, a negotiated response, increased 
surveillance auditing or issuing of an infringement notice may be appropriate.  
However, in other situations, because of the nature of the non-compliance, a 
prosecution or licence revocation may be the most appropriate response (see Figure 
3). 
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Figure 3   DNR&W Compliance Enforcement Options. 
ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS
Statutory Notices
ProsecutionLicence/Permit Revocation
Warning Notice
No Action
Infringement 
Notice
 
Strategic 
DNR&W also maintains a strategic capability, based on dialogue and consultation, to 
respond to changing community expectations and developments in the field of 
sustainable natural resource management.  If the need for legislative or policy review 
is identified, the Department has the capacity to address this through: 
• Internal review processes; 
• Consultation with internal and external stakeholders; 
• Policy reform; and  
• Legislative reform (where requested by Government). 
As part of its strategic approach to compliance, DNR&W has been engaged in a 
review of all of its legislation with a view to evaluating and extending the range of 
compliance remedies available.  ‘Best practice’ remedies being utilised by any 
regulatory agency, environmental or other, will be considered.  This may include a 
range of civil and administrative penalties, such as negotiated settlements, legal 
undertakings and administrative orders, along with punitive responses, such as 
commercial benefit penalties.  DNR&W has raised with Queensland’s Crime and 
Misconduct Commission the possibility of applying ‘proceeds of crime’ legislation to 
environmental offences. 
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It can be seen that DNR&W has been attempting to adopt the principles of the 
trust’-based paradigm in developing its compliance strategy. 
However, the question must be asked: Has the adoption of a proportionate 
approach to compliance based on a trust paradigm succeeded in making the 
penalties associated with that strategy acceptable (i.e. seen to ‘fit the crime’) by those 
being regulated?  Furthermore, irrespective of the compliance strategy adopted, does 
an agency really know if its rules are being obeyed and if not, why not? 
Monitoring rural media may suggest that the answer is ‘no’ to both questions.  
But at present, there is insufficient empirical evidence to answer these questions with 
any degree of confidence. 
Conclusion 
What do offenders say? How can we find out? 
 ‘The whole art of war consists in getting at what lies on the other side of the 
hill, or, in other words, what we do not know from what we do know’. 
(Duke of Wellington 1815) 
This statement, by the Duke of Wellington in 1815, was made in the aftermath of his 
victory over Napoleon at Waterloo.  It succinctly encapsulated the Duke’s belief in 
the inestimable value of accurate intelligence in overcoming adversity on the battle 
field. 
Regulators have been fighting a battle to improve levels of voluntary uptake of 
compliance by landholders.  It is a battle in which victory has been elusive.  This 
may, in part, be due to the fact that the level of research, the ‘battle field’ intelligence, 
is poor at best.  Perhaps, they are just not effectively separating out what they do not 
know from what they do know and, as a result, are not getting a good picture of 
what lies ‘over the hill’. 
This paper has utilised Rational Choice/Routine Activities Theory and 
Control/Social Bond Theory to explore a range of factors that may contribute to 
landholders rejecting regulatory programs as ‘not fitting the crime’.  This paper also 
discussed how these factors can erode the value of coercive regulatory strategies and 
create a culture of resistance to compliance by landholders.  The value of adopting a 
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trust-based compliance strategy that incorporates a continuum of proactive and 
reactive measures based on the regulatory pyramid design was also canvassed. 
However, what this paper also attempted to demonstrate was that, while 
extensive literature and research are available on general criminological constructs 
(see bibliography), there is insufficient empirical evidence to genuinely know if: 
• The use of the ‘trust’ paradigm will succeed in achieving greater acceptance 
that environmental penalties do ‘fit the crime’ by stakeholders; and 
• Our agency’s rules are being obeyed or not. 
Therefore, in conclusion, this paper recommends that a coordinated research 
program be conducted that considers the following: 
1. Develop a typology of repeat natural resource compliance offenders;  
2. Conduct research with natural resource compliance offenders to understand 
their motives, methods and opinions;  
3. Map environmental compliance activity, outputs and the incidence of 
natural resource compliance offending, to identify geographic and 
socioeconomic patterns in its occurrence;  
4. Draw on the expertise of natural resource compliance investigators and 
litigators to respond to these incidences in a considered, and more consistent 
manner;  
5. Develop preventative measures, including an incentive-based regime (in 
consultation with stakeholders) to assist in the voluntary uptake of 
compliance by landholders; and  
6. Develop a model for determining the costs of non-compliance that reflects 
the economic and social impacts of non-compliance.  
As stated at the commencement of this paper, society looks to regulatory agencies 
such as DNR&W to ensure that their compliance strategies will protect the 
environment now and into the future.  Natural resource regulatory agencies need to 
demonstrate that they can effectively develop sophisticated regulatory strategies that 
both encourage voluntary compliance and, where appropriate, deter offenders 
through effective punitive measures.  These parallel approaches are not mutually 
exclusive but complementary, and will enable us to better use our natural resources 
in a manner that maintains a balance between society’s current demands and the 
needs of future generations.   
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Unless we can start to develop better research, or ‘battle field’ intelligence, 
within an environmental context, we will continue to be uncertain if we are 
‘maintaining the balance’ by ensuring that deterrent mechanisms are effective and, in 
fact, do ‘fit the crime’. 
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